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ABSTRACT
It is shown that, when there is a genuine long-run trade-off between in-
flation and output, coordination under pre-commitment yields substantial
impirovements in economic welfare. The analysis is conducted withln the
context of a two-country model with capital accumulation, immobile
labour, perfect capltal mobility and floating exchange rates. If the
home government increases its monetary growth rate, it increases home
inflation, reduces the world real interest rate and therefore boosts
both home and foreign capital accumulation. The foreign country thus
enjoys a gain in output without suffering from higher inflation.
Competitive policies lead to too tight monetary policies and too low
levels of activity, since each country prefera to be a'free rider'. Co-
ordination leads to a lower world real interest rate end higher welfare.
Pre-commitment is necessary, since otherwise each government has an in-
centive to renege and levy a'surprise' inflation tax. Both cooperation
and competitive policy formulation lead, in the absence of binding con-
tracts or reputational forces, to excessive monetary growth rates and
higher levels of activity than under coordination or competition with
pre-commitment. Coordination can be futile, since it exacerbates the
lack of credibility perceived by the private sectors.
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This paper .ís concerned with the issue of whether policy objectives
in an interdependent world are better achieved when governmenta cooperate
than when national decisions are arrived at in a competitive fashion. The
layman might take for granted that cooperation between governments would
definitely make things better than they otherwise would be. However, most
of the theoretical and empirical findings presented in the macrceconomic
literature have hardly supported the leyman's view. For example, Carlozzi
and Taylor (1985) show that the gains from concerted government actions are
negltgible in an empirical study based on a two-country model where capital
is perf'ectly mobile, exchange rates are flexible and labour markets behave
according to the staggered wage-setting hypothesis (Taylor, 1979, 1980). In
such a model long-run output is at its full-employment level and cannot be
affected by government policy, although there is e long-run trade-off be-
tween the varinnces of output end prices. Carlozzi and Taylor (1985) find
that individual governmenta can achíeve the optimal trade-off between the
asymptotic variability of output and prices just as well by choosing their
own monetary rules as by cooperation.
A similar conclusion is reached by Miller and Salmon (1985) in a two-
country model where output is demand-determined in the short run and where
there is risk-neutral arbitrage between domestic and foreign government
bonds. In this study there is no long-run conflict between the level of
output (given by a vertical Phillips-curve in the long run) and inflation
either. A flexible exchange rate allows each country to choose independent-
ly the desired rate of change ín the domestic price level. Each country mi-
nimises a welfare function, which is the integral of a weighted combination
of the square of core inFlation and squared deviations of output from its
natural rate. Again, no long-run gains from coordination are found, so that
coordination is concerned with the efficient adjustment towards given long-
run targets. The seme problem is discussed in the work of Currie and Levine
(1985) and Oudiz and Sachs (1985). All these studiea are based on "neo-
Keynesian" models, where the level of activity is affected by monetary
shocks in the adjustment to equilibrium, even though the long-run equili-
brium level of output itself is given and cannot be affected by current,
past or prospective future policy actions. One typically finds that non-
cooperative policy formulation leads to too tight monetary policy and too
loose fiscal policy in the procesa of adjustment, so that non-cooperative
disinflation occurs excessively fast.-z-
Similar conclusions about the desirability of coordinated policies
have been obtained in flexible price, rational expectations models with
pre-negotiated nominal wages. An example is given by Buiter and Eaton
(1985), who show that the Nash solution is optimal when the objective in
each country is minimising fluctuations of actual output around its ex-ante
or ex-poat natural level. They also point out that gains from policy coor-
dination can only arise when the number of policy targets exceeds the num-
ber of policy instruments. This means that in models where there is no
long-run trade-off between output end inflation, the analysis may as well
(as in Buiter and Eaton, 1985) be confined to one objective at a time, sc~y
the minimisation oP fluctuationa of output around its ex-post frictionless
level. In fact, if the only problem is due to the fact that spot labour
contracts are not executable, the above criterion appears to be the most
sensible one to adopt. A convincing welfare-theoretical rationale for this
view has recently been provided by Aizenman and Frenkel (1985).
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate whether substan-
tial gains from cooperation might arise in the presence of a genuine long-
run ínflation-output trade-off (when governments can pre-commit themselves
to their announced policiea). Under conditions of complete debt neutrality,
capital accumulation and money bearing no rate of interest there is, as in
the case of a closed economy (e.g. Tobin, 1965; Fischer, 1979; Begg, 1980;
Buiter, 1981), a genuine long-run trade-off between inflation and output.
This trade-off is based on a two-country version of the Mundell-Tobin ef-
fect. It is assumed that neither country likes inflation; the rationale for
the costs of inflation are the usual onea presented in the literature (e.g.
Fischer and Modigliani, 19~8). Both countries, however, desire high levels
of activity. The interesting feature of such a two-country model is that
high inflation in one country leads to a reduction in the world real inte-
rest rate and therefore to higher output in both countries. This means that
there is an incentive to transfer the burden of bearing high inflation to
the neighbouring country. Here the case for cooperation becomes much
stronger and is also relevant in the long run, for if both countries are
prepared to live with higher anticipated inflation rates a mutual higher
level oF activity and of economic welfare could be achieved.
However, this unambiguous policy prescription m~y not be robust with
respect to plausible changes in the specification of the model.-3-
Retaining the assumption of full price flexibility, a"Keynesian" flavour
can be introduced by rejecting Barro's (1974) ultra-rational Ricardian hy-
pothesis and therefore allowing bonds to be part of net wealth and consump-
tion to be affected, to some extent, by diaposable income. In other words,
the restrictive hypotheais of perfect capital markets is relaxed so that
private agents are unable to borrow (against future life-time expected
earnings) on the same terms as governments can do.l In such a context lower
monetary growth leads to less seignorage revenues and therefore forces the
servicing of smaller government debt, so that there is a possibility of
lower wealth and consumption despite higher holdings of real money balan-
ces. Hence, there is a possibility that a reduction in inflation increases
investment and output in the long run so that there is no policy dilemma.
However, this possibility seems rather unlikely.
Section 2 sets up a perfect-foresight model of interdependent econo-
mies with capital accumulation, inflation and efficient exchange markets.
Section 3 examines the long-run conflict in international objectives under
the two alternative specifications discussed above. Section 4 presents a
linearised version of the model of interdependent economies presented in
Sections 2 and 3. Section 5 analyses the potential long-run gains from co-
ordination by comparing various competitive and cooperative outcomes. It
first considers the "rules" outcome where each government can pre-commit
itself, vis-à-vis the private sector, to its announced present and future
monetary policies. Here cooperation is unambiguously superior to competi-
tive policy formulation, since coordination achieves a reduction in the
world real rate of interest and an increase in global activity. However,
this 'rules' outcome suffers from time inconsistency as each government has
an incentive to levy a"suprise" inflation tax on its private sector.
Therefore Section 5 also considers credible or time-consistent monetary po-
licies. It shows that the resulting "discretionary" outcomes for coopera-
tion are no different from the time-consistenL outcomes under competitive
policy formulation end both lead to excessive monetary growth rates and
higher levels of activity than under coordinated or competitive policy for-
mulation with pre-commitment. Hence, in the absence of binding contracta or
reputational forces, cooperation is futile. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1 An alternative formulation is based on private sector agents having,
instead of infinite lives, e finite probablity of death (Blanchard,
1985; Marini and van der Plceg, 1988). However, note that Gale (1983)
has shown that Ricardian equivalence can hold in disequilibrium Keyne-
sian models.-4-
2. Capital accumulation and inflation in interdependent economies
Consider two interdependent economies wi[h a floating exchange ra[e and
perfect capital mobility. There is imperEec[ substitution between home and
Eoreign goods, although home and foreign government bonds are freely tradeable
without cost and therefore perfect substitutes. Both labour and capital are
immobile. Since this paper is maínly concerned with long-run conElict in
lnternational objec[ives, prices in bo[h the goods and asset markets are
assumed to be flexible and agents are assumed to have perfect foresight. All
foreign variables and expressions are denoted by an asterisk.
Total demand in the home country, Y, consísts of consumption of home
goods by home, CD(-), and foreign households, CMa(~), and of gross
investment. The IS-curve ignores [he effects of the real rates of interest
and is given by
Y- C~(PYpIPC, y, V) t K t 6K t CM~(P~YNa~P~, Y, Va).
~
Ci, Ci ~ 0, Vi,
where Y~, V, K, d, y, M, P and PC denote disposable íncome, real wealth,
capltal, [he depreciation rate, the real exchange rate, the nominal money
aupply, the price of home goods and the consumers' price index of the home
country, respectively. Home consumption and exports of home goods increase
when home real disposable income or wealth increases and when the real ex-
change rate depreciates. It is straightforward to allow for a negative ef-
fect of the home real interest rate on home consumption and of the foreign
real interest rate on exporta, but this dces not affect the qualitativt;
properties of the reduced form and is therefore ignored. Goods market equi-
librium is given by
Y - f(K, N) (2.2)
where the supply of goods follows from a concave constant-returns-to-scale
production function, f(K, N). The aupply of labour abstracts from wealth
and intertemporal substitution effecta end is given by-5-
N~ NS(wc;)' NS y ~' (2.3)
where w~, is the real consumers' wage. The special case of an inelastic
supply uf labour corresponds to NS ~ 0. The demand for labour follows from
fN s w and ia Kiven by
N ~ KnDlw), nD ~ 0,
where w- w~P~IP is the real producers' wage. The LM-curve is given by
(2.4)
MIP~ ~ L(PYIP~ , r) ~ L(Y, r)PIP~ , LY ~ 0, Lr ~ 0, (2.5)
where r is the numinal rate of interest. The real demand for money incteases
when real income or the price of consols increases. It is assumed [hat L(~)
is humogeneous of degree one with respect to its first argument.
The policy variable oE each government is i[s monetary growth rate,
u- MIM or v", which it can increase by purchasing consols. For simplicity,
the effects of the government's fiscal policies are suppressed, so that the
government's budget constraint can be written as
VM t Blr ~ B, (2.6)
where B is [he number of outstanding bonds. The servicing of the government
debt has to be Einanced, either by printing money or by issuing new bonds. It
has been assumed that bonds are not necessarily part of private sector wealth,
since financing of the public sector borrowíng requirement by bonda may be
perceived as an immedia[e reduction in disposable income by the dlscounted
stream of future taxes required to service the increased government debt:
V- [PK t K t aBlr]IP~, 0 ~ a ~ 1, (2.7)
where a is the extent to which government bonds are net wealth. It is-6-
assumed that changes in the stock of net foreign assets are a neglible
proportion of changes in total financial wealth, so that the effects of
current-account dynamics can be ignored.2 With the aid of (2.6)disposable
income can be defined as
YD - Y t(BIP) -(1 - a)(BIrP) ~ Y t a(BIP) t(1 - a)x~. L-MIP. (2.8)
so that an increase in [he monetary growth rate implies less bond-finance, less
future taxes and therefore a higher level of disposable income. The case a s 0
corresponds to full debt-neutrality and relies on perfect capital markets and
infinite lives or dynasties (e.g., Barro, 1974). In that case there are no
liquidity constraints and thus CD - Ci ~ 0 may be a reasonable assumption.
The case a} 0, CD ~ 0 and Ci ~ 0 corresponds to when agents are not ultra-
rational or not altruístic or to when capir.al markets are imperfect.
The consumers' price index is given by
PC - H(P, P~E), H1, HZ ~ 0, (2.9)
where E is the nominal exchange rate and H(.) is homogeneous of degree one.
The consumers' price index íncreases when the price of domestic or foreign
goods increases. For example, a depreciation raises the price of imported
goods and thus the consumers' príce index. The demand for capital follows from
the arbitrage condition
fK(K. N) - r t ó- n, n-(PIP)e. (2.10)
which equates the margínal product of capltal to its user coet (i.e., the
rental plus depreciation charges, minus expected capital gains). Flnally, the
real exchange rate, y- PeEIP, follows from [he ínterest pari[y condition
r- n- r~ - n~ t(YIY)e. (2.11)
Z Dornbusch and Fischer (1980) analyse the effects of current-account dynamica
in a small open economy without capital accumulation.-~-
Equation (2.11) says that the arbitrage actions of risk-neutral speculators
ensure that the uncuvered interest rate differen[ial equals the expected rate
of exchange depreciation. Forward integration yields
Y([) - Y(m) expl - t~ {(r(s. C) - n(s. t)) -(r~(s. t) -~`(s, t))}ds~.
(2.12)
where x(s, [) denotes the expectation of x(s) formed at time t, hence the
real exchange r;ite appreciates relative [o its equillbrium value whenever the
sum of all future expected real in[erest rate differentials in favour of the
home country is positíve.
The complete two-country model can be described by 21 equations, that is
equations (2.1)-(2.11) and the foreign equivalents of equatíons (2.1)-(2.10).
It corresponds to a two-country extension of previous models of closed economíes
with Mundell-Tobin effects, which were constructed to demonstrate the non-
neutrality of anticípated demand-side policies (e.g., Fischer, 1979; Begg,
1980).
3. Long-run conflict in international objectives
L.abour market equilibrium, NS(w~) a Knp(w~H(1, Y)). gives w~ ~ h(K, Y),
hK a nD~(NS - KnDH) ) 0, hY a KnDw~HY~(NS - KnpH) ( 0 so that employment is
given by,
t t - t -
N~ NS(h(K, Y)) - h(K. Y). hj ' Nshj,j ' K. Y
and aggzegate supply by
t t t - t -
Y~ f(K. h(K, Y)) - F(K, Y). FK ~ fK t fNhK ~ 0, F~ ~ 0, FY ~ fNhY ( O,
(3.2)
where fKK . fKNhK ~ 0 is assumed to hold for both countries.-8-
Hence, an increase in the capi[al stock shifts out the labour demand
schedule and thereíore increases the real wage, equilibrium employment and
aggregate supply. A depreciation of [he real exchange rate increases the wedge
between the producers' wage and the consumers' wage, so that employment and
aggregate supply fall.
In the steady state, the real interest rates at home and abroad are
equalised and the respective inflation rates are solely determined by domestic
monetary growth rates. Hence, r- n- r~ - n~, n- v, n~ - u~ and Y~ 0.
From ( 2.10) and (2.11), it follows that in long-run equílíbrium




K~ ~~(K , Y), ~K a(f~ t f~hK)I(fK~K~ t fK~N~hK~) ~ 0, (3.4)
~Y ~(f~hY t fK~N~hY~ Y )I(fK~K~ t fK~N~hK~) ~ 0.
When the two economies are ídentical and have the same monetary growth rates,
(3.4) yields K~ - K in long-run equilibrium.
3.1 Bonds are not net wealth
Consider a world with perfect capital markets and infinitely-lived agents
who perceive that a change in the holdings of bonds will eventually have to be
matched by a future change in taxes of equal discounted value. In the absence
of intertemporal borrowing constraints, the impact of current disposable Lncome
on consumption is negligible and can be ignored. When a~ O, wealth conaists
only of real money balances and capital, that is, V-(PK t M)~PC. Hence,
net investment can be written as-9-
K- F(K, 'r) - C~(.. Y.{K t L(F(K. Y). fK(K. h(K, Y)) t n- 6]}~H(1, Y))
r
-(: (.. Y.iK~ t L~IF"(K~, Y- ), fK~(Kr`, he(Kk. Y-1)) t n~ - 6~]}~
- (-) t t
H~(1, Y-1)~-~K- I(K. K~. Y. n, na). (3.5)
where the partial derivatives ( evaluated at the steady state) are given by
~ t L if t f h})H-1 t f h ~ 0, IK 3 r- u- CV(1 t LYFK r KK KN K N K
LK,~ -- C~~(1 t LY~FK~ i Lr~{tK~K~ t fK~N~hKk})H,r-1
I s F - CH - CN[L F t L f h- VH ]H 1- CMe t CMe(L~F~
Y Y Y V Y Y r KN Y Y Y V~ Y Y~
t LttfK~N~hY~ - V~HY~]H,~-1~Y~2 (C 0).
In - - C~LrH-L ) 0
and
1~~ . - CV~Lk~H~-1 ~ 0.
r
The Life-cycle hypothesis gives C~ ti r- U. so that IK K 0 as long as
labour supply is not too elastic. Hence, the increase in output, caused by
an increase in home capítal, is outweighed by the increase in home consumption
(due to higher wealth) and the íncrease in wear and tear, thus resulting in a
reduction in net investment. Similarly, an increase in foreign capítal booats
foreign wealth and therefore there is an increase in home exports and a
corresponding fall in net home investment. A depreciation of the real exchange
rate has four effects. The first is an increase in the home real consumers'
price index, which causes a fall in home real wealth and [hus a fall in home
consumption and an increase in home investment. The second effect is a fall
Ln the foreign real consumers' price index, which causes an increase in foreign-io-
wealth and thus an increase in home exports and fall in home investment. The
third effect is to increase the volume of home consumption and exports and thus
to reduce net investment. The fourth effect is to increase the wed~;e betwecn
the producers' and consumers' wage, so that aggregate supply falls and therefore
savings and net investment fall. The first and second effects cancel out in
~
symmetríc rconomiea wíth CV a C~~, so [hnt L! U. An incrine:r In thc h~nnr
Y
inflation rate increases the home nominal interest rate, so that agents
economise on holdings of money balances, wealth and consumption fall, and thus
net investment increases. An increase in the foreign inflation rate íncreases
the foreign nominal interest rate, which reduces foreign wealth and home exports
and thus increases net home investment.
Inflation is ín the short run determíned by (2.5), (2.10) and (3.2),
MIP - L[F(K, y), fK(K, h(K, y)) t n- 5], so that
t - ?
n - n(K. M, Y) P
where
nK - - (LyFKILr - f~ - f~hK ~ 0,
IIL ~ Lrl ~ 0,
and
nY - - (LyFYILr) - fKNhY j 0.
(3.6)
The partial derivative IIK has been evaluated on the assumption that labour
supply ís not too elastic (small hk, hY). A hígher stock of money requires a
lower interest rate and inflation ra[e in order to induce agents to willingly
hold lt. A higher capít;il stock Lncreases Lncome, reduces the real interest
rate, and therefore increase money demand,whích is choked off by higher
inflation.-11-
A depreciation of the real exchange rate cuts income and reducea the real
ínterest rate, so that [he short-run effect on inflation is ambiguous.
Obviously, inflation is in the long run determined by the monetary growth rate
(n - u)-
The steady-state effects of monetary growth on activity and the real
exchange rate follow from:
- - t t (-) t t
I[K, ~y(K, Y). Y, U. U~] ' 0
and
(3.7)
- } t - (-) t t
I~[y(K, Y), K, 1~Y, U", u] ' 0. (3.8)
Figure 1 represents equations (3.7) and (3.8) as the zero-savinga loci describing
equilibrium in the home goods market (GME) and foreign goods market (GME~),
respectively. The CME-locus slopea downwards, because the excess demand for
home goods, induced by an increase in capital at home and abroad, is choked
off by a fall in net exports and increase in aggregate aupply, induced by an
appreciation of the real exchange rate (and cut in the wedge between the
producers' and consumers' wage). An increase in home (foreign) monetary growth
íncreases inflation and reduces holdinga of real money balances, wealth and
consumption (exports). A real depreciation eliminates the incipient excess
supply of goods, so tha[ the GME-locus ahifts upwards. Equílibrium at home
and abroad yíelds
t t t t t t
K' K(u, u~), N~ N(u, ue), Y~ Y(u, u~)
and
(t)(-)
Y - Y(u. u").
(3.9)
(3.10)
If the two economies are identical, the home and foreign monetary growth catea
will be the same whether noliciea are coordinated or datermined competitively-12-
(in Nash equilibrium) and therefore K- K~ and Y- 1. l[ is clear that an
increase in the home monetary grow[h rate leads to the same increase in home
inflation, a reduction in the world real interest rate and thereEore [o an
increase in botli [he liome and foreign levels of capital, output and employment.
'ihis is [he interdependent analoKue oC the Mundell-Tubin eCCect and expla[nv
tha[ monetary expansion is a"locomotive" policy in the long run. In fact,
Fígure 1: Long-run effects of an increase in the home mone[ary gruwth rate
in "ultrarational" interdependent economies
Eoreign inflation is unaffected and [herefore each country has an incentive
to transfer the burden of reducing the world real interes[ rate to the other
country.
3.2 Imperfect capital markets and selfishness
Now consider [he situation where Barro-Ricardo deb[ neutrality does not
hold and where there are liquidi[y cons[raints, hence a- 1 and home con-
sumption and exports of home goods depend [o a certaín extent on home and-u-
foreign disposable income, respectively. Manipulation of the government budget
3
constralnt, (2.6), and (2.7) yields long-run real wealth:
V~ ~PKt(r~(r - n)) MIIP~,. (3.11)
An increase ín inflation acts as a tax and therefore allows the servicing of
a larger interest-bearing government debt, which boosts the real value of
private sector wealth. Upon substitution of (2.5), (2.9), (2.10) and (3.2)
into (3.11), one obtaíns the financial component of long-run real wealth:
V-(PKIP~) - LIF(K. Y)IH(1, Y), fK t v- 5)(fK t u- 6)I(fK - 6)
t - ?
- VF(K. Y. u). VF - tr~r t(MIP~)I(r - u) j 0. (3.12)
v
An increase in the monetary growth ra[e increases long-run inflatlon, which
íncreases the nominal interest rate and reduces the holdings of money balances.
However, it also increases [he revenue from the "inflation tax" and allows the
servicing of a larger interest-bearing government debt. The net effect of
inflation on financial wealth is therefore ambiguous. Note that, with full
debt neutrality ( see Sectíon 3.1), inflation unambiguously decreases financial
wealth in the long run.
Upon substitution of (2.9), (3.2), (3.12) and B~P~ ~ uVF into (2.1),
one ubtains [he long-run expression:
K~ F(K. Y) - bK - CD[F(K. é)~H(1. Y) ' Y.V-(K. 7. N), Y,
KH(1. ,)-1 ' VF(K. 7. K)~ - CM.[F`r(KR. r-1)~HM(1. l~r) i
u~VFr(K~. l,r. H~). r. K~H~(1, l,r)-1 a V~(K~. 1~Y. HM)~
(-) - (-) 7 ~
. 1(K. K~. y. k. H~) - 0. (3.13)
3 Ir. the long run M~M ~B ~B ~ y, so that ( 2.6) gives B~M - ry,~(r - yt).
Substitution into (2.7) gives (3.11).-14-
One of the differences with Section 3.1 is that real income and interest payments
now play a role in the consumption and export functions. This tends [o accentuate
[he nega[ive effects of an increase in home or foreign capital and a real
depreciation on net investment. The main point is, however, that the long-run
effects of the monetary growth ra[es on net ínves[ment are no longer unambiguous
(as they were in (3.5)):
Iu -- C~(VF t uV~) - C~VU ~ ~
and
Iu~ -- CY~(VF~ t u~VU~) - C~~VU~ ~ 0.
~
For example, if Vu ~ 0 and Vu~ ~ 0, then Iu ~ 0 and I~~ ~ 0 and
therefore Ku C 0 and Ku~ ~ O. It is therefore possible that, if the effects
of [he "inflation tax" on public sector debt are large enough, an increase in
the monetary growth rate reduces both the home and foreign levels of capital,
output and employment. In that case, monetary expansion ís a"beggar-thy-
neighbour" policy, but more importantly the long-run conflíct between inflation
and output or employment has disappeared. From a practical point of view, it
seems unlikely thai there is no conflict between inflation and activíty.
vevertheless, the relaxation of debt neutrality does seem to improve the long-
run inflation-ou[put trade-off.
4. A linearised disequilibrium syatem of interdependent ec~nomies
It has been shown ín Section 3 that a higher do"iestic mone[ary growth
rate typically leads in the long run to increases in capital, output and
employment. A linearised disequilibrium version of this resuit for symmetric
interdependent economíes with C~ s CM ~ r- n around u- u" ~ 0
4
can be written as:
4
Equatíons (4.1)-(4.2) follow from log-linearising
K~ F(K. Y) - C~(. , Y, (K t-L)H-1) - Ch~(.. Y. (K~ t L~)H~1) - 6K,
equations (4.3)-(4.4) from log-linearising ( 3.6), and equation (4.5) from
é : fK - fK,~.-15-
k~- Blk~ - 82(R t R~) - 83e, k(0) ~ kp,
ke '-91k - 62(R t Y.e) t 63e. k~(0) ' k~. (4.2)
R' u- n' u- 84k t BSR. - 96e, R(0) - free, (4.3)
Re ' u~ - x' - u" - 84ke t BSR~ t Bbe, 1C~(0) ' fcee, (4.4)
and
e' B~(ke - k) - 98e, e(0) ~ free, (4.5)
where e~ log(Y), k and ,~ ~ log(L) : log(M~P) are expressed ea the loga-
rithmic deviationa from the steady-state levels associated with zero in-
flation
(u-ur'0). ~el ' C~ ) 0, SZ ~ C~.~K~ ) 0. g3 '-(FY- C~ - CY-)á~K ~ 0,
~4 . KRK ) 0. p5 '- LRL ) 0' g6 ~ rRr ~ 0' ~.] ~- K(fKK ; fKN--K) ) 0 and
p8 ~- 2Yf~hy ) 0. The steady state is given by n' u, n~ -y,~, e s 0,
k ' k~ - - }(pZIG)(u ' H ) end ,C ' ((pl ~ }~2~qIp5)H - (gZAqIsS)K~]~n,
where n~- SlgS -~Z~4 C 0. The normalisation ~2 ~- 2e is employed, so
that in steady state k- k' - K t K. The normalisation g2 -- 2p is em-
ployed, so that in steady state k~ k' - p t y,w. Hence, in the steady atate
inflation is entirely a monetary phenomena, purchasing power parity holds
and activity (the real interest rate) ís, vie the interdependent Mundell-
Tobin effect, an increasing (decreasing) function of monetary growth at
home and abroad. The steady-state level of real money balances decreases
when home monetary growth increases and when foreign monetary growth de-
creases. It can be shown that, when 2g3~ ) PlsB, the Jacobian of the
system (4.1)-(4.5) satisfies the saddlepoint property, that is, it has two
stable eigenvalues associated with the backward-looking (predetermined)
variables, k and k~, and three unstable eigenvalues associated with the
forward-looking (jump) variables, ,~, ,~~ end e.
In fact, given that the two economies have an identical structure, it
is possible to give a complete diagrammatic analysis in terms of global
averages and differences (cf., Aoki, 1981). If average activity and average
liquidity in the world economy are given by ka .}(k . k~) and ~.a ~}(,~ .
,~~), one obtains the independent sub-system:-16-
Similarly, if kd - k- k~, one obtains the independent sub-system:
ka -gl -g` ka
-B4 85 Ra
0






The determinants of the Jacobians of (4.6), ~ ~ 0, and of (4.7),
8188 - 26387 C 0 (for noc [oo elastic labour supply), are both negative, so
that the equilibria of the two sub-systems are saddlepoints.5 This correspunds
to the forward-looking behaviour of Ra, 2d and e and to the backward-
looking behaviour of ka and kd.
Since there are no shocks that give rise to relatíve demand shifts, (4.7)
shows that kd z e~ 0 must hold all the time. It follows that k- k~ a ka,
k- Ra t?~Rd, E~ - Jta -~Rd, n a 84k - BSE and n~ - B4k - Bsk~,
k, Ra and Rd - R. - R~ follow from the dynamics of (4.6) and
R.d ~ ud t BSRd, Rd(0) ~ free.
where
(4.8)
No[e that there is no exchange rate overshooting, because the goods and labour
markets are assumed to clear instantaneously.
Figure 2 shows what happens if there is an unanticipated permanent
increase in either the home or foreign monetary growth or ín both. On impact
global real líquídity jumps discretely downwards, overshooting its new
equilibrium value, and afterwards gradually rises along the stable arm to the
Ra
5 The eigenvalues of the system (4.1)-(4.5) and of the systems (4.6), (4.~)
and Rd ~ ud - B,,kd t ss id t 28~e are exactly the same.-17-
new equilibrium E1. Employment, output and capital (i .e., activity) do not
chanKe on impact, but afterwards gradually increase as the real interest rate
b
falls. Un impac[, the difference in real liquidities, A. , jumps immediately
to (u~ - v)~BS. Hence, a common increase in the monetary growth rates leads
on impact to an upward jump in the common inflation rate which overshoots the
higher equilibrium level. ALso, an increase in the home monetary growth rate
reduces home Liquidity and increases foreign liquidity and therefore increases
home inflation and reduces foreign inflation. The dynamic consequences of
anticipated or temporary changes in the monetary growth rates can also be
analysed in terms of averages and differences.
h'igure Z: Unanticipated increase in monetary growth in interdependent economies
6
The speed at which activity moves towards the new equilibrium is gíven y
~(BS - B1) - ~ (BS - S1) - ~ --Le-
5. Gains from macroeconomic policy coordination: a long-run perspective
This section compares various cooperative and competitive outcomes. The
welfare loss function of each government is quadratic and depends positively
on activity and negatively on inflation:~
Min W z f[B(k - k)2 t n2]exp(-pt)dt, 0~ 0, k~ 0
u o
where k and zero are the desired values for the two objectives of economic
policy and p is the rate of time preference. The long-run conflict manifests
itself in the tacget (or full-employmen[) level of the capital stock being
inconsistent with no inflation. Note that the qualitative conclusions of the
analvsis are unaffected when the government also cares about the level of
na[ional income and~or employment, as both of these are positively correlated
with output. The individual governments minimise (5.1) subject to the system
(4.1)-(4.5). Discounting is introduced to ensure that the welfare loss functíon
converges, but to keep matters simple results are presented for the case where
the discount rate is arbitrarily small. This does not affect the qualitatíve
nature of the results. Section S.1 considers the steady state of various
cooperative and competitive differential-game outcomes when each government can
pre-commit itself to its announcements about present and future monetary
policies. The Appendix shows that, when p ~ 0, those steady-sta[e outcomes
with pre-commítment can also be obtained from minimising the asymptotic welfare
loss function, 0(k - k)2 t uZ for the home government and 0(k~ - k)2
} u~2
for the foreign government, subject to the steady-state constraint,
k- k~ - v t u~. The Appendix also considers the disequilibrium features of
~ The effects of a more general welfare loss functíon, which depends on
aggregate consumption and therefore on income (capital), liquidity and
monetary growth, is discussed in Sectlon 5.2.-19-
the optimal strategíes. Section 5.2 uses differen[ial game theory to analyse
the Lntertempora] trade-offs and demonstrates [hat the non-cooperative outcomes
of Section 5.1 are time inconsistent. Section 5.2 also discusses credible
solutiun concepts for competitive decision making in interdependent dynamic
ecunumics with perfect foresight.
5.1 Asym~utic cooperative and eompetítive outcomes under pre-commitment
In the Nash equilibcium each country takes the policies of the other
country as given, which yields the asymptotic reaction curve
v z 9(k - v~)I(1 t 6).
When the rival country íncreases its monetary growth rate, home output
(5.2)
increases yet home inflation is unaffected. This diminiahes the marginal
welfare of íncome, so that the liome government shifts its attention towarda
the inflation target and thus reduces its monetary growth rate. The interaection
of the home and foreign reac[ion curve yields, for the case k s k~, the
asymptotic symmetric Nash equilibríum solution:
p z u~ ~ uN - 6kl(1 t 26). (5.3)
Obvioiisly, when the priority attached to improvíng capítal, output or employment
(6) increases, the governments end up with higher inflation rates.
An alternative solution concept for competitive policy formulation ia
the Stackelberg equilibrium solution. If the foreign country is the leader,
it minimises its welfare loss function subject to the follower's reaction curve,
(5.2). This yields the leader's asymptotic monetary growth rate,
u~ L us - 0kl(1 t 39 t B2) ~ uN, (5.4)-20-
and the follower's asymptotic monetary growth rate,
u-vs 9(1 t 0)kI(1 f 30 t 92) ~ pN ~ us. (5.5)
The leader has managed to transfer some of the burden of loweríng the world
real interest rate to the follower, which makes the leader better off and the
follower worse off than in the Nash equilibrium solutíon.g Note that both
countries also end up with lower levels of capital, output and employment than
in the Nash equilibrium solution.
When the two countries coordinate their monetary policies, they might
minimise the global welfare loss:
Min W t W~ - WJ~9(k - k)Z t 9(k~ - k~)2 t n2 t n~ZJexp(-pt)dt, (5.6)
v,u~ o
which, in the absence of asymmetric preferences, yields the Nash bargaining
solutíon. Thís yields the asymptotic cooperative monetary growth rates,
u L u~ - u0 - 20kI(1 t 40) ~ us y UN ~ us,
(5.7)
so that coordínation leads to a joint expansion of monetary growth rates. The
reason for this is that with cooperatíon there is no longer an incentíve to
transfer the burden of bearing high inflation to the rival cuuntry. The steady-
state level of activfty under coordination (k L k~ ~ k0) exceeds the level of
activity under Nash-competitíon (k ~ k~ - kN)which exceeds the level of activity
under Stackelberg-competition (k - k~ a ks - us t us): k0 ~ kt,~ ~ ks. The
cooperatíve outcome is not sustainable without some form of cu~mnítment, sin.~.
each country has an incentíve to deviate. If the home country cheats, i[
chooses to reduce its monetary growth,
8 The follower is worse off, because it ends up wi[h higher inflation and
lower output, k ~ k~ z k9(2 t B)~(1 t 38 t BZ) ~ 2y, than in the Nash case.-21-
uy ~ u' u~ - B(1 t 26)kI(1 f 49)(1 t 9) ~ uN, (5.8)
in order [o reap the benefits of a relatively low world real ra[e of interest
without suffering Erom high inflation. The various cooperatíve and
cumpetitive uutcomes are portrayed in Figure 3.
lt ca~i be shown that the percentage reduction in welfare losa
obtained from international policy coordination is 100 9I[(1 t 9)(1 t 40)],
which corresponds to 7.4X, lOZ, L1.1Z and lOx for 6 - 2, 1, ~ and ~. These
are substantial gains from coordination, since they last forever. The
corresponding gains in previous studies are zero (e.g., Currie and Levine,
1985; Miller and Salmon, 1985; Oudiz and Sachs, 1985; Rogoff, 1985), since
these studies only cunsidered transient trade-offs.
If, however, one country (say, the foreign country) were interested in a
relatively higher level of national activity (ke ~ k), one obtains
u' u" - u~ - 0(k t k~)I(1 t 49)
under coordination or
(5.9)
0[k t 6(k - ks)JI(1 t 29) (5.10)
and
u~ e uN ' 9[ks t 0(ka - k)]I(1 t 20) ~ uN
(5.11)
under competitive (Nash) policy formulatíon. The foreign country engagea in a
more inflationary strategy, since it cares more for a higher level of activity.
The home country benefits from the reduction ín the world real interest rate
and can thereEore afford to pursue a less inflatíonary strategy.-22-
Flgure 3: Cooperative and competi[ive monetary policies under pre-commitment
Key: R-. Reaction curve of home countrv
N - Nash equilibrium
S- Stackelberg equilibrium (if the home country follows)
E - Efficient outcomes
C - Cooperative (Nash bargaining) outcome
D- Deviation of the home coun[ry from [he cooperatíve outcome
L - "Loss oE leadershíp" solution
5.2 Credibility and coordination
The problem with decentralised international policy formulation with pre-
commitment, as discussed in Section 5.1, ís that i[ is [íme inconsistent, sínce
each government has an incentive to revise and re-op[im;se its announced op[imal-23-
monetary polic[es after some [ime. This time inconsistency cefers to the fact
tha[ it pays a government or Central Bank to renege on the promise it has made
abou[ its fu[ure monetary policies to the private sectors. It should be dis-
tínguished from when a guvernmen[ deviates from a cooperative agreement and
cheats on a rival government. The time ínconsistency also holds a[ the steady
state of the pre-commitment non-cooperative outcomes, so that these outcomes
are, in the absence of "binding contracts" or reputational forces, unattainable
or not credible. This can be seen from the fact that the shadow prices of
the forward-looking expectations variables, Ra and Rd,9 are zero at the
beginning of the planning períod, as they are uncons[rained by their past
hLstory at time zero and therefore their marginal contribution to economic
welfare should be zero at that point of time, but they differ from zero
after time zeru (see Appendix). The intuition behind the time inconsistency
of optimal monetary policy is [hat each government has an incentive [o levy
a"surprise" Lnflation tax and thereby erode [he real value oE money balances
(cf., Calvo, 1978). The time inconsistency uf the non-cooperative outcomes
with pre-commitment raises welfare by a sufficient amount to ensure that all
multilateral incentives to renege with a"surprise" inflation tax are
eliminated (see Appendix), which can be seen from the fact that the ahadowprices
of the forward-Looking variables, Ra and Rd, are always zero for this case.
However, there is, of course, the usual unilateral incentive to deviate from
[he cooperative outcome (see equatíon (5.8)).
When neither government can pre-commit itself to its announced optimal
monetary growth rates, time-consistent non-cooperative outcomes are relevant.
Boch the "luss oE leadershíp" solu[ion proposed by Buiter ( 19B3) and the
9 For the Stackelberg outcome with pre-commitment, the home country's
shadowprice of activity is also a forward-looking variable as far as the
foreign country is concerned (see Appendix).-24-
dynamic programming solution proposed by Cohen and Michel (1984)10treat [he
forward-looking variables, Ra and Rd, as predetermined at the time of
optimisation and, as the Appendix shows, lead to an infinite number of
solutions. However, if the monetary growth rate enters the welfare loss
functíon dírectly or indirectly, this indeterminacy can be resolved. For
example, if each government wants to increase aggregate consump[ion and decrease
inflation, the welfare loss criterion becomes, instead of (5.1):
Min W~ oJ[9(91k t 62R f 93u - c)2 t n2Jexp(-pt)dt, 01, 92, 03, c~ 0
u
(5.12)
where c denotes the desired value of aggregate consumption. The long-run
conflic[ now manifests itself in the target level of aggregate consump[ion
being inconsis[ent with no inflation. Consumption of home and foreign goods
increases with wealth, so that it increases with capital (k) and holdings of
real money balances (R). Consumption typically also depends on disposable
income, so that i[ increases with production íncome (proxied by k) and, [o
the extent that public sector deficits are not financed by consols, the dis-
counted stream of future inflatíon taxes diminíshes (see equation (2.8)) and
thus consumption íncreases with the monetary growth rate (yL). It is a
straightforward exercise to show that, when c~ c~, [he steady-sta[e values
of the monetary growth rates under international policy coordination wi[h pre-
commi[ment are
964c ( 294 - 1 1
u- u~ - uC - 2, B4 - 291 t 92II1 g J t 93 (5.13)
1 t 694 5
and under decentralísed formulation of national policies with pre-commi[ment
are
10
.I.he dynamic programming solution asaumes that Ra and Rd are a lineac
function of the predetermined variable, ka,as given by the s[able manifold.-zs-
005c I S4 - 1 l
u' ux -''V - l f 99, 9-
: u~,. 0~ 05 - 01 t Bz I( gs JI t 03 ~ 04-
~. i
(5.14)
Ihe s[eady-values of consumption are given by 04u~ and 94u~, respectively.
Note that, vhen 01 - 1, 02 : 03 - 0 and c- y, then g4- 2, g5 - 1 and thus
;5.13) and (5.14) reduce to (s.7) and (s.3). - -
It is also clear that competitive policy formulation with pre-commitment
leads to inefficiently low levels of monetary growth and activity. Coordi-
nation with pre-commitment is, for g3 ~ 0, now time inconaiatent, since the
marginal value of global liquidity to the world planner is strictly negati-
ve and therefore there is en incentive to renege and impose a"surprise"
inflation tax (aee Appendix). Decentralised policy formulation is, as be-
fore, time inconsistent.
Now consider the credible outcomes. The "loss of leadership" solution
recognises that the governments are unable to influence the expectations of
[he private sectors and therefore treats the forward-looking variables, R~
and Rd, as predetermined. It follows that the "losa of leadership" solution
for both the cooperative and non-cooperative outcome lead to the following
monetary growth races(See Ap~endix):
- cI04 ~ u~ ~ uN. (5.15)
Since the governments have lost their ability to make credible announcements
about future monetary policy, the governments perceive that they cannot
influence the inflation rates and therefore pursue a policy of exactly achieving
the desired level of aggregate consumption. I[ follows that international
cooperation is futile as the welfare loss is exactly the same as under the
competitive (Nash or Stackelberg) outcomes, that is W- W~ - W1 - cZ10~,11
11
Strictly speaking, the welfare losses for the case that p i 0 do not
converge and therefore canno[ be evaluated. Hence, the welfare loasea
given are asymptotic averages over time.-zb-
There simply i s no point in internatíonal. polícy courdinatfon, bec~use nei[her
~:uuntry h~s credíbiLity and therefore each country ís forced to set the levrl
of activi[y to its desired level.
The asymptotic welfare loss under policy coordination with pre-commitment is given by
W~ W~ ~ WC - 6c2~(1 t 664) ~ WL. (5.16)
so that the world planner can obviously improve global welfare when it can
establish binding contracts or a reputa[ion for not reneging with Che private
sectors. The welfare loss of competítive (Nash) policy formulation with pre-
commitment is given by
W a W~ - WN - 6(1 t BBS)cZ~(1 t 99485)2
which is less than WL if 1 t B94(9593 - 92)~BS ~ 0 holds.
(5.17)
It may be that the foreign country cannot pze-commit and is therefore
forced to use credible policies, u~ ' uL. If the home government can pre-commit
then the steady-sta[e outcome under decentralised policy formula[ion is given by
u~ uNC - 995cII84(1 t 005)) ~ yN. (5.18)
Since the foreign government is forced to have an excessive monetary growth rate,
it carries most of the burden of reducing the world real interest rate. It
follows tha[ the home country can reap the benefits in terms of hígher activity
and therefore engage in a less inflationary polícy. Note that, íf
1 t 094(9593 - 9Z)~85 t 0, the foreign government has no incentive to build a
reputation with its private sector, but that the home government has an
unambiguous incentive to pre-commit ítself (as W'
WNC - cuNC,e4 ~ WL)'
6. Concluding remarks
The main objective of this paper was to investigate the case for
coordination in the presence of a genuine long-run output-ínflation trade-off-z~-
when governments are able to pre-commit to their announced optimal poli-
cies. In a classical stock-flow model of interdependent economies, higher
retes of monetary growth boost economic activity at home and abroad due to
a two-country version of the Mundell-Tobin effect. Non-neutrality of go-
vernment debt and liquidity constraints weaken the long-run output-infla-
tion trade-off, since a higher rate of monetary growth means more revenues
from the "inflation tax", permits the servicing of a higher government debt
and therefore the associated increase in private sector wealth increases
consumption and leads to some crowding out of private sector investment.
Since each country wishes to tranafer the burden of higher inflation and
the job of lowering the world real interest rate to the other country, com-
petitive policies (whether in Nash or án Stackelberg equilibrium with pre-
commitment vis-à-vis the private section lead to too low inflation ratea
and to too low levels of capital, output and employment. Coordination leads
to a lower world real interest rate and higher activity, but each country
has an incentíve to deviate by lowering its rate of monetary growth. These
results suggest an international stale-mate in reducing the world real rate
of interest.
However, if the governments are unable to pre-commit themselves due to
the absence of binding contracts of reputational forces, the above results
no longer hold. The problem ís that the pre-commitment or "rules" outcomes
are time inconsistent, since each government has an incentive to renege and
levy a"surprise" inflation tax and thereby erode the real value of money
balancea accumulated by the private sector. The consistent or "díscretio-
nary" ("loss of leadership") outcomes lead to excessive monetary growth
rates, since neither government is able to manipulate the inflation rate
and therefore they attempt to achieve the desíred level of real activity
exactly. It therefore dces not matter whether governmenta coordinate or en-
gage in competitive policy formulation and in both casea welfare is worse
that under international policy coordination with pre-commitment. Hence,
international policy coordination without pre-commitment yields the same
welfare as competitive policy fotmulation without pre-commitment whilst
pre- commitment without international cooperation does not pay.-28-
Previoue studies (e.g., Carlozzi and Taylor, 1985; Miller and Salmon,
1985; Currie and Levine, 1985; Oudiz and Sachs, 1985) did not allow for a
long-run trade-off between output and inflation, hence the optimal plan is
consistent once the steady state ia reached and dynamic inconsistency is
therefore a transient issue. However, when there is a long-run trade-off
between activity and inflation, both the competitive and cooperative poli-
cies with pre-commitment are time inconsistent, even once the steady state
has been reached. Clearly, time inconsistency is therefore a more persist-
ent problem in models with long-run trade-offs. It should be pointed out
that there may be a long-run role for international policy coordination in
natural-rate-models when there are permanent shocks and both fiscal and
policy instruments (e.g., Currie, Levine and Vidalis, 198~). In such models
international cooperation without pre-commitment and pre-commitment without
international cooperation do not necessarily pay (also see Rogoff, 1985:
Miller and Salmon, 1985: ~udiz and Sachs, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1988). How-
ever, some argue that, when the game between the two governments and the
private sector is treated as a sequential game, international policy coor-
dination is a dominant and subgame-perfect strategy of the two Central
Banks and therefore non-cooperation without pre-commitment is not a rele-
vant outcome (Carraro end Giavazzi, 1988).
Although it requires e considerable stretch of the imagination, it may
be useful to indulge in a brief empirical note. In the late sixties and
early seventies the trust and cooperation between governments and private
sectors that developed in the immediate post-war period broke down in most
countries. This meant that governments could no longer make credible an-
nouncements about future monetary policy. The eventual result was the con-
sistent solution with excessíve inflation rates and too high levels of ac-
tivity relative to the outcomes that would pertain under international po-
licy coordination with pre-commitment. In the late seventies and eighties
governments began to build a reputation for "sticking to their guns" (cf.,
Backus and Driffill, 1985). This meant that after some time pre-commitment
beceme feasible. This resulted in a non-cooperation trap of much too low
monetary growth rates and too low levela of real activity. It is not clear
whether welfare is now lower or higher than in the early seventies, but it
is clear that, now credibility has been achieved, there are large welfare
gains from international policy coordination. The challenge is to persuade
the major industriel countries to multilaterally increase their monetary
growth rates, reduce the world real interest rate, increase world activity
and increase welfare without damaging the reputations with the private sec-
tors.-29-
There are at least four interesting directions of future research. The
first ís to explore the issues discussed in this paper within the context
of a model with proper micro foundationa. The main difficulty will be to
specify a satisfactory theory of the demand for money, but at least an ex-
plicit welfare analysis will be possible. It will be neceasary to sllow for
time-varying rates of time preference and for finite horizons (Blanchard,
1985) in order to give a role for monetary policy (Marini and van der
Ploeg, 1988). Finite lives are required, because when agents are infinitely
lived monetary policy is superneutral (Sidrauski, 196~). The second
direction is to properly allow for current-account dynamics (cf., Dornbusch
and Fischer, 1980). The third is to relex the classical features of the
model presented in this paper and to allow for Keynesien rigidities in wage
and price formation (e.g., Taylor, 19~9, 1980). This meana that the levels
of real liquidity become predetermined and are no longer forward-looking,
so that there is an inflation-output trade-off even under credible policy
formulation. In such a more general model, it is possible that, if govern-
ments cannot pre-commit, coordination cen exacerbate the "credibility con-
straints" and therefore can be counter-productive and make both countries
worse off (cf., Rogoff, 1985). It is also possible to allow for internal
adjustment costs in investment decisions. This provides additional incent-
ives to renege, for a government might announce a high monetary growth rate
in order to depress the real interest rate end encourage inveatment. But
once some capital has been accumulated, the government cheats and imple-
ments a lower monetary growth rate than promised. This reneging goes in the
opposite direction of the levy of a"surprise" inflation tax and can pro-
vide an additional reason why coordination might be counter-productive. The
final direction is to extend the analysis to a model of three of more in-
terdependent economies (e.g., Canzoneri and Henderson, 1986). If the two
countriea considered in this paper are the U.S. and Europe, it is implicit-
ly assumed that the individual countries that make up Europe cooperate and
coordinate their policies. However, when the member states of Europe engage
in competitive policy formulation and there are international externali-
ties, the aggregate reaction curve of Europe differs. Cooperation within
Europe may engender a deflationary response of the U.S., which can concei-
vably make coordination of European policies counter-productive.-30-
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Appendix
Coordination
The cooperative strategíes, when the governments can pre-commit them-
selves to their announcements about present and future policies, can be found
from choosing u and u~ to minimise W t W~, i.e., (5.6), subject to
equations (4.6), (4.8), k a k~ a ka, n~ S~ka - SS(Ra t~Rd) and
n~ - S4ka - BS(Ra -~Rd) If the Hamiltonian i s defined as
H-~ele(ka - k)2 t e(ka - k~)Z t{94ka - 85(Ra t ~eRd))2 t{94ka - 85(Ra - 1lRd)}2
t alka t aZRa t a3Rd, (A1)
one obtains Hu3 `~a2 t a3 - 0, Hp~3 ~a2 - a3 ~ 0.
uA~ - i,l - If i s 0(k`~ - k) t ~i(ka - k~) t 841E14ka-fi5(Qa t~SRd)}
k
t 84{84ka - 85(Ra -`~Rd)}- Blal - 84a2, al(o) ~ free (A2)
P,1L - ~Z - H a - - 65{B,ka - BS(Ra t ~iRd)} - 85{84ka - 85(Ra - ~Rd)}
~t
- Bzal t BSa2, aZ(0) ' ~. (A3)
and
p~3 - ~3 L H d - - `~BS{84ka - 85(Ra t `iRd)} t !ig5(S4ka - BS(Ra - ~iRd)
R
t BSa3, a3(0) - 0 (A4)
as the first-order conditions. Since Ra and Rd are forward-looking
variables and unconstrained by their past history, their marginal contribution
to welfare must be zero at the beginning of the planning horízon and con-
sequently az(0) ~ a3(o) - 0 (cf., Calvo, 1978). In fact, Hu - Hu~ - 0
yields aZ(t) - a3(t) ~ 0, tlt ~ 0. This implies that for cooperative
stra[egies there is no multilateral incentive to re-optimise (renege), so that-A2-
policy coordination is time consístent. (There is, of course, a unílateral
incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome). It follows from (A4)
that Rd(t) - 0, `dt ~ 0, so that A, a R~ n Ra. ( A3) gives n~ n~ a-!~R ~ ~g
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and (4.8) gives u- u~. Upon substitution of these results and (4.6) into
(A2), one obtains, after some manipulation, the closed-luup representatiun
of the optimal open-loop (pre-commitment) policies for p~ 0:
u a u~ ' R4ka - RS1Ca t~(R2~R5)[(264 - 1)(R4ka - 05Ra) - 84ka
- 0(ka - kl - 0(ka - k~)],
Substitution of (AS) into (4.6) yields the closed-loop system:
(AS)
ka -- Rlka - 02fta, ka(0) - k0 (A6)
Ra '`-f(R2~R5)[(2R4 - 1)(64ka - BSRa) - R4ka - 0(ka - k) - d(ka - k~)], ka(0) ~
free.
(A7)
The Jacobian of the system (A6)-(A7) has one stable and one unstable eigenvalue,
t~(R2IR5) 1~, corresponding to the backward-looking variable, ka, and the
forward-looking variable, JCa, respectively. The steady state of this system
yields u a ue ~ n s n~ - 0(k t k~)~(1 t 40) (see ( 5.7) and (5.9)) and
k z k~ ~ 20(k t k~)~(1 t 4B ). The movement along the stable manifold is
given by
k(t) - k~(t) ~ exp(-at)ka(0) t[1 - exp(-at)]2B(k t k~)~(1 t 40) (A8)
where the speed of adjustment, 1-~(827R5) 1~, is an increasing
function of the priority attached to the output target.
If the welfare loss críterion is, ínstead of (5.1), ( 5.12) and c a c~,
v~ u~ ~ uU is given by (5.13), a2(m) - 2003 c~(1 t BB4) ~ 0 and a3(m) - p,
If 03 ~ 0, there is a multilateral incentive to renege as ~2(m) } 0. Hence,-A3-
with welfare lnss functions that depend on [he monetary gruwth rate, policy
courdlnatton with pre-cummitment is cfine Incunsistent. The "loss of
leadership" sulution ( 8uiter, 1983) sets AZ - a3 - O, Yt ~ 0 and therefore
Bly t 0ZR t 03u - 01y~ t BZRe t 03u~ - c, tlt ~ 0. Hence, in the steady scate,
u ` u~ ` u~ - cI04.
Competitive Nash equilíbríum
1'he optimal policies with pre-commítmen[ oE the home cuuntry, given
the optimal policies of the foreign countcy, may be found from choosing y
to minimise W, i.e., (5.1), subject to (4.6) and (4.8). One obtains
HV- ~vZ t v3 - 0,
pvl - vi - H a- 0(ka - k) } 84{84ks - 85(2a t~P.d)} - Blvl
k
- fS4vZ, vl(0) - free, (A9)
pv2 - vZ ' HRa -- 85{84ka - 85(Ra t~Rd)} - 8Zv1 t BSvZ, vZ(0) ` 0 (A10)
and
pv3 - v3 ` E1 d`-`~85(64ka - 85(Ra t~Rd)} t 85v3, v3(0) ' ~. (All)
f
where the home country's Hamiltonian is defined as
H-!~0(ka - k)Z t 51{g4ka - 85(Ra t~aA.d)}Z t vlka t vZka t v31Cd. (A12)
Similarly, for the foreign country one obtains `~vZ - v3 - 0,
pvl - ~i ~ 0(ka - k~) t 94(84ka - 85(Ra -`~Rd)} - 81vi
- 64v2, vi(0) ' free,




ov3 - v3 ~~i85(ó4ka - gs(Ra -~Rd) ) t 85v3, v3(0) - 0. (A15)
5(nce there are 5 predetermined variables, i.e., ka, v2, v3, vZ and v3,
and 4 jump variables, i.e., Ca, fd, vl and vi, the transient dynamics
takes place on a 5-dimensional stable manifold. The steady state of this system
for p- 0 satisfíes from (4.6)-(4.8) ka - u f u~, n- u and n~ - u~, from
(A9)-(A11), u- 9(k - u~)~(1 t 6), and from (A13)-(A15), u~ ~ 6(k~ - u)~(1 t 9).
Intersection of these asymptotíc reaction curves, i.e., (5.2), yields the
steady-state Nash equilíbrium with pre-commitment, (5.3) or (5.10)-(5.11).
The associated steady-state values of the co-states are vi z- 265uN~62 ~ U,
v2 z- 2v3 -- uN ~ 0, vl 3- 265uN~62 C 0 and vZ - 2vj -- pN ~ 0. Unless
there are no distortions in the economies (k ~ k~ a 0), each government has
an íncentive to re-uptimise (renege) and re-set the co-states of the forward-
looking variables to zeco as after time zero v2 ~ 0, v3 } 0, vz ~ 0 and
v~ - 0. This problem of Cime inconsistency means that the Nash equilibrium
with pre-cc.-nitment is, in the absence of explicit or implicit binding
contracts, not credible. The "loss of leadership" solution to the problem
of time inconsístency (8uiter, 1983) treats the forwatd-looking variables as
given, so that v2(t) z v3(t) 3 v2([) a c,~t) - v3(t) 3 0, tlt ~ 0 and
equations (A10), (All), (A14) and (A15) are ígnored. It is immediately clear
from (4.6), (4.8), (A9) and (A13) that [here are an infinite number oE "loss
of leadership" solutions (even if p~ 0). Because the backward-looking laws
of motion are independent of economic policy, the same indeterminacy occurs
for the time-consistent solution proposed by Cohen and Míchel (1984).
If the welfare loss criterion is (5.12) rather than (5.1), the pre-
commitment outcomes are gíven by (5.14),
v2(m) ~ v2(m) ~ - ~iuN - 9(63 -'Se2s51) (c - 94pN) t 0-AS-
and v3(m) '- v3(m) -~pH t~B9ZS51(c - 94uN) ~ 0 and are therefore [ime
inconsls[ent. The "Loss of leadershíp" solu[ion sets v2 ~ v3 ' vZ ~ v3 ~ 0,
Vt ~ 0 and therefore 91k t BZE t 83p ~ 91k~ t 02R~ t 93ye ' c, tlt ~ 0.
The steady-state outcome is [herefore u' u~ ' uh - c~e4.
Competltíve Stackelberg equilibrium
The optimal policies with pre-commitment of the Stackelberg leader may
be found from ciioosing the tíme-trajectory for u" to minimise We subject
to (4.6), (4.8), vZ a- 2v3, (A9), (A10) and (All). (All) can be replaced by
285n t 82v1 - 0. Hence, if the leader's Hamiltonian fs defined as
H" - 18(ka - k)2 t il94ka - 85(Ra -'~Rd)}2 t wlka t w2Ra t w3kd
t w~vi t wsvZ t wb(2H5(B4ka - 85(Ya t~Rd)} t BZvl]
one ub[a1.~s Hu~- ~wZ - w3 ~ 0,
pwl - wl - H~a - 8(ka - k) t 84(84ka - 85(Ra -~Rd)} - 81w1 - 84w~
k
-(9 t 84)w4 t 8485w5 t 285w6, wl(0) ' free,
pwZ - w2 - HRa '- 65(84ka - BS(Ra -~Rd)} - 82w1 t~Sw2 t S485w4
- BSwS - ~8yY6. w2(0) ' 0,
pw3 - w3 ' HPd - ~65{84ka - 85(Ra - ~Rd)} t BSw3 t ~8485w4 - ~BSws
- 8485w6, w3(0) ' p,








pw5 - ws ' ti~ - B4w4 - 85w5. w5(0) ' free. (A21)
2-A6-
The transient dynemics takes place on a 4-dimensional stable manifold asso-
ciated with the predetermined variables ka, yZ(- - y3), u2(- u3) and ~4'
The steady state of this system can be shown to give k- k~ - ks, u- us
and u~ - y,s when P a 0. The pre-commitment outcomes are time inconsistent,
since y2, y3, W2, c~3 and u4 are non-zero after some time has elapsed.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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